

Governance Structure of the Public Sector in the Political Economy of Islam

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Abstract

Talking of the governance structure of the public sector in the political economy of Islam, we mean the way we organize public choices. The governance structure of the public sector in conventional political economy has been based on democracy. In a democratic governance structure, the public choice problem occurs mainly out of cognitive and motivational problems. The cognitive problem happens due to insufficient knowledge of voters of candidates and low level of professionalism in candidates. The motivational problem is rooted in the conflict of private and regional interests with public interests. In Islamic governance structure of the public sector in Islam, we could reduce the problem of public choice by relying on a system of *Velaie* governance. In a *Velaie* governance structure, reliance on the Taqva (purity) of public governors and the management of a just pure Faqih and a professional legal system reduces the cognitive and motivational problems. The important thing is how to design institutions in a *Velaie* governance structure so that we could reduce public choice problems. In this vein, we could construct the *pubic* governance structure in Iran by applying advices such as the construction a professional parliament and setting some rules and structures for insuring stability in public choices.

KeyWords: Governance, Velaie Governance, Public Choice, Political Economy of Iran, Islamic Parliament.

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